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1
A HISTORY OF INHERENT 
CONTRADICTIONS: THE ORIGINS AND 
END OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
JAMES R. KURTH
It has long been understood that there is something peculiar, even 
paradoxical, about conservatism in America. American conserva-
tism is different from conservatism in other countries, even those 
that were the original source of many other American ideas and 
ideals, the countries of Europe. Indeed, the very term “American 
conservatism” is something of an oxymoron. For most Europeans 
who came to America, the whole purpose of their difficult and dis-
ruptive journey to the New World was not to conserve European 
institutions but to leave them behind and to create something new, 
often an entirely new life, and even a new identity, for themselves.
In this chapter, I will examine how the paradoxes of Ameri-
can conservatism have unfolded and revealed themselves in the 
course of American history. In many respects, the history of Amer-
ican conservatism has been the working out of certain inherent 
contradictions and fatal flaws, beginning with the origins of a dis-
tinctive and peculiar kind of conservatism in eighteenth-century 
America, through its full development during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, to the great debacle of this original 
American conservatism during the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
to the reinvention and transformation of American conservatism 
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during the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, and finally to the recent 
debacle of this reinvented conservatism during the Great Reces-
sion, which began in 2007 and which continues into the 2010s. I 
will conclude with a review of the current condition of what now 
passes for American conservatism.
The Three Dimensions of American Conservatism
In recent decades, political analysts have found it useful to inter-
pret American political movements by distinguishing between dif-
ferent policy dimensions or arenas. Thus, conservatives have been 
divided into: (1) those who are most concerned about economic 
or fiscal issues, that is, pro-business or “free-enterprise” conserva-
tives; (2) those most concerned with religious or social issues, that 
is, pro-church or “traditional-values” conservatives; and (3) those 
most concerned with national-security or defense issues, that is, 
pro-military or “patriotic” conservatives.
These three arenas are not of equal weight and strength in the 
conservative movement, however. It is the business elite that, in the 
long course of American history, has proven to be the most power-
ful component of the conservative coalition; it has gotten its way 
on more issues than either the religious or the security conserva-
tives, and it has done so not only within the conservative coalition 
itself, but also with actual government policies. Calvin Coolidge 
may have exaggerated somewhat when, in the 1920s, he said that 
“the business of America is business,” but it has been no exaggera-
tion that the business of American conservatism has been business.
It was the achievement of Ronald Reagan that he was able in the 
late 1970s to unite these three different kinds of conservatism into 
one grand coalition. This was the culmination of a “fusionist strat-
egy” that had been developing amongst American conservatives 
since the early 1960s.1 For a while, especially during the 1980s, 
it may have seemed that these three kinds of conservatives were 
natural allies, that they had an “elective affinity” for each other, 
and that there was no significant contradiction between them. 
However, as we shall see, pro-business conservatism has always 
included a tendency toward the disruption and even dissolution 
of religious ideals and social practices. This is the famous “cul-
tural contradictions of capitalism,” identified by social theorists 
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as varied as Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, and Daniel Bell.2 And 
in recent decades, pro-business conservatism has also included a 
tendency toward the dismantling of national boundaries and even 
dissolution of national identities, and therefore the redefinition 
of national security. This is the famous “globalization” project of 
American multinational corporations and financial institutions.3 It 
took about two decades for the fusionist strategy to put together 
the Reagan grand coalition, and then, about two decades after 
Reagan’s departure, that grand coalition began to fall apart.
Economic Conservatism
In Europe, economic conditions had been shaped by an estab-
lished landed class and a highly restricted market in land and 
labor. In America, economic conditions were instead shaped by an 
open market in land and labor, and this was reinforced and ener-
gized by the open Western frontier. The Industrial Revolution of 
course greatly diminished the relative importance of landed wealth 
in the economy, but in Europe the traditional idea of an estab-
lished economic order — supported by the state and by intimate 
connections between property owners and government officials, 
between the wealthy and the powerful — was carried over into the 
new industrial economy (and, to some extent, even into the post-
industrial or information-age economy of our own time). Con-
versely, in America, the idea of an open market was carried over 
into the new industrial economy (and even into the post-industrial 
or information-age economy as well). The long-standing American 
condition of an open market in just about every economic sector 
meant that there normally was not an established economic order 
to conserve. If something were going to be conserved, it would 
normally be the open market or “free-enterprise” system itself. But 
the idea of free enterprise was a central pillar of the ideology of 
European, and classical, liberalism, not of European conservatism. 
This meant that in America conservatism was committed to con-
serving liberalism, or at least a central pillar of it.4
Thus, the Federalists, the Whigs, and the Republicans have suc-
cessively been considered to be the more conservative political 
party within the United States, but each of these has also succes-
sively been the most pro-business and free-enterprise party. Since 
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business or capitalism is actually one of the most unsettling, even 
revolutionary, forces the world has ever seen, this means that the 
conservative party in America has always sought to conserve a 
revolutionary force. This revolutionary business or capitalist force 
not only disrupts and destroys existing economic arrangements 
(Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”). It destroys religious, social, 
and ultimately moral arrangements as well. This means that when 
religious and social conservatives make an alliance with economic 
“conservatives” (who are really economic or “classical” liberals, or 
even libertarians), they are making an alliance with a force that will 
often choose to betray them. And since the business conservatives 
are the senior partner within the conservative coalition and the 
religious and social conservatives are a junior partner, these latter 
conservatives will be betrayed, and marginalized, again and again.
Religious Conservatism
In a pattern similar to that of economic conservatism, in Europe 
an established state church shaped religious and moral condi-
tions. In America, particularly after the adoption of the U.S. Con-
stitution, religious and moral conditions were instead shaped by 
the separation of church and state and even by religious pluralism. 
There was early on a competition between different denomina-
tions within the dominant Protestant religion. These competing 
Protestant denominations were soon joined by the Roman Catho-
lic Church, which itself included a variety of ethnicity-based par-
ishes, and by the Jewish community, which included a variety of 
congregations with differing views on the relationship between 
tradition and modernity. Indeed, with all of these competing reli-
gious teachings and practices, there soon developed something 
of an open market in religious ideas and institutions, comparable 
and parallel to the open market in land and labor — and this too 
was reinforced and energized by the open Western frontier.
This open market in religious matters, so nicely isomorphic with 
the open market in economic matters, was a powerful factor gen-
erating both a reality and an ideology of free choice in the United 
States.5 But another factor lay in the fact that the founding and 
dominant religion in the United States was Protestantism, rather 
than some other religion (such as Roman Catholicism or Eastern 
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Orthodoxy). In its very origins as a distinct religion, Protestantism 
“protested” the established religion of Catholicism and thereby 
promoted the idea of some measure of free choice.6 However, in 
Europe that choice was mostly the choice of a monarch (especially 
in the Lutheran or Anglican countries) or of an oligarchy (espe-
cially in the Calvinist or Reformed countries). It definitely was not 
the free choice of ordinary individuals. These European patterns 
were reproduced in the original European settlements in America, 
with colonies that were directly ruled by appointed representatives 
of the British monarch being Anglican (for example, Virginia) 
and colonies that were ruled by local oligarchies being Reformed 
(such as Massachusetts).
With the American Revolution and then with the U.S. Constitu-
tion, however, the forces supporting established state churches fell 
away. New denominations, particularly Methodists and Baptists, 
rose up, especially during the Second Great Awakening (1800s to 
1820s), and these denominations very much emphasized the free-
dom of choice of the individual believer. It is not an accident that 
the democratic revolution of the Andrew Jackson era of the 1830s 
was especially robust in those regions of the United States where 
the Second Great Awakening, Methodists, and Baptists had been 
especially robust only a decade or two before. Thus, the religious 
revolution brought by the Second Great Awakening and the dem-
ocratic revolution brought by the Jackson era greatly reinforced 
and amplified the religious pluralism, open market, and individual 
choice that had already begun to characterize the United States. 
This meant that there was no longer an established religion — and 
eventually no longer even an established morality and culture — to 
conserve. If something were going to be conserved, it would be the 
religious open-market (“free exercise of religion”) system. Again, 
this idea of free exercise of religion was a central pillar of the ide-
ology of European liberalism, not of European conservatism. This 
meant that in America conservatism was again committed to con-
serving liberalism, or at least a central pillar of it.
It was thus in the nature of American Protestants that many of 
them would be inclined to protest this or that religious doctrine 
or practice and therefore to separate and form new churches or 
even new denominations. Conservatism in matters of religion was 
often merely the stance that the older Protestant churches took 
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when they had become the target of all this protesting and separat-
ing. Since these churches were continually being left behind, reli-
gious conservatism was associated with once-dominant churches 
that were now dwindling into a minority, and would later dwindle 
into marginality.
However, there eventually came a time when all Protestants, 
both old churches and new ones, had something substantial to 
conserve, and this was Protestantism itself, in the face of the chal-
lenges posed by the new religious communities that were coming 
to America. This began with the arrival of masses of Irish Catho-
lic immigrants in the 1840s, shortly followed by the arrival of far 
smaller, but still significant, numbers of German Jewish immi-
grants in the 1850s. Now, all Protestants had something to con-
serve, at least whatever it was that they held in common that was 
not Catholic or Jewish.
Various Protestants in various regions and localities did use 
economic and social institutions to contain the advances of non-
Protestants. But Protestants faced serious problems when they 
tried to use political institutions, including political parties, for the 
same purpose. By the 1850s, the separation of church and state 
was very far advanced in the United States, and there was no lon-
ger much of a legal basis for excluding non-Protestants from gov-
ernment institutions. Protestant conservatism was contradicted by 
what had by now become Constitutional conservatism.
The religious — and more broadly, the moral and social — con-
servatives in America have not been consistently aligned with one 
political party (such as the Republican Party). In this respect, the 
religious arena has been somewhat different than the economic 
one. In particular, the Democratic Party from the 1890s to the 
1920s represented many fundamentalist Protestants in the South 
and in the West, most obviously when William Jennings Bryan was 
the party’s presidential candidate in three elections. Overall, how-
ever, the Republican Party has represented the Protestant part of 
the American population more consistently than has the Demo-
cratic Party, with the Democrats being quicker and more effective 
in reaching out to assist and incorporate new immigrant groups, 
which were bringing new religions into the United States (as 
examples, first Catholics and then Jews).
A History of Inherent Contradictions 19
The Subordination of Religious Conservatism to 
Economic Conservatism
One of the most powerful contradictions at work within American 
conservatism has been the different interests and perspectives of 
the Protestant conservatives versus those of the economic or busi-
ness conservatives. In their religious identity, most Americans in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have wanted 
to conserve some sort of Protestant morality and culture. But in 
their economic identity, many of these same Americans benefited 
from the admission of new immigrants, even if these were Catholic 
or Jewish. Businessmen in particular have always wanted cheaper 
labor, and new immigrants have always facilitated this. From a busi-
ness perspective, considerations about the immigrants’ religion 
and culture are distinctly secondary (or even lower) in impor-
tance. Even ordinary middle-class Protestants benefited from 
cheaper labor, in the form of domestic servants. And of course it 
was the businessmen and middle-class Protestants who controlled 
the political parties, particularly that party which was supposed to 
be the more conservative one, first the Whigs and later the Repub-
licans. Thus, the party elites — who benefited from free and open 
immigration — continually overrode the pro-Protestant and anti-
immigrant wishes of many working-class voters. Initially, these 
voters tried to form new political parties (the Know-Nothings in 
the 1840s and 1850s and the Populists in the 1880s and 1890s), 
but these parties were soon co-opted and then subordinated by 
the major political parties dominated by pro-immigration busi-
ness and middle-class elites. It was not until these elites themselves 
turned against immigration, that is, when business interests were 
temporarily overridden by security ones (during the Red Scare of 
the late 1910s through the early 1920s), that serious restrictions on 
immigration were enacted (such as the Immigration Act of 1924).
Security Conservatism
The similar dynamics that have been at work in economic conser-
vatism and religious conservatism also have had a parallel dynamic 
at work in the third dimension of American conservatism, that 
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of security conservatism. This is the conservatism that puts spe-
cial emphasis on issues of military policy, national security, and at 
times patriotic or national identity.
In European countries (with the partial exception of Britain), 
security conditions were shaped by threats from foreign armies 
existing on all sides and in close proximity. This gave rise to 
strong centralized states possessing and deploying large standing 
armies — a state-army complex — or what might be termed an estab-
lished security system, parallel to the established landed classes 
and the established state churches that we have already noted. In 
America, as the Founders recognized, security conditions were 
instead shaped by the United States being separated from other 
great powers by oceans and by having neighbors who were rela-
tively weak. George Washington nicely articulated this concept in 
his famous Farewell Address in 1796:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in 
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little 
political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary 
interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. . . . Our 
detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a 
different course. If we remain one people under an efficient gov-
ernment, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury 
from external annoyance . . . when belligerent nations, under the 
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly haz-
ard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as 
our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advan-
tages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon 
foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any 
part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of 
European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our 
true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of 
the foreign world.7
The result of “the advantages of so peculiar a situation” was not 
exactly parallel to the open markets in the economic and religious 
arenas (an open market in security is difficult to imagine), but 
normally there was an absence of military conscription (and there-
fore a high degree of individual free choice with respect to security 
issues) and an absence of heavy taxation to support a large military 
establishment. And even though the Western frontier represented 
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a zone of violence and insecurity for much of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the very weakness of the Indian tribes or “nations” (as they 
were called by the federal government at the time) compared 
with the strength of the European nation-states, meant that the 
actual conditions of the Western frontier reinforced the general 
sense within the United States of an unthreatening security envi-
ronment and of individual free choice in security affairs. This 
long-standing American condition of security meant that there was 
not an established security system to conserve. If something were 
going to be conserved, it would normally be the no-conscription 
and low-taxation (and free-choice) system. But the ideas of no con-
scription, low taxation, and free choice combined into yet another 
central pillar of the ideology of European liberalism, not of Euro-
pean conservatism. This meant that in America conservatism was 
once again committed to conserving liberalism, or at least a cen-
tral pillar of it.
The Subordination of Security Conservatism to 
Economic Conservatism
The industrial revolution and more recently the information rev-
olution have been propelled by successive developments in tech-
nologies, particularly those that have enabled improvements in 
transportation and communication — in the ability to move peo-
ple, goods, and ideas faster and farther. These new technologies 
obviously provided great profit-making opportunities for new busi-
ness enterprises that could provide the faster and farther trans-
portation and communication services. But they also provided old 
business enterprises with new and much larger arenas in which 
to operate and profit. This meant that each new improvement in 
transportation and communication technologies expanded the 
profit-making area beyond the territorial borders of the existing 
political and governmental units.
Thus, the railroad and the telegraph in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and the automobile, telephone, and radio in the early twen-
tieth century enabled business enterprises to reach (and to push 
beyond) the borders of any particular American state. Indeed, 
with these technologies, the most efficient operating and profit-
making area had become the territory of the United States, of the 
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American nation, as a whole. Business firms soon left behind any 
identification — be it practical, ideological, or sentimental — with 
the particular state in which they had been founded and incor-
porated, and they sought to expand to at least the territorial bor-
ders of the United States. These enterprises became a relentless 
and often ruthless force hollowing out the powers of the particular 
states and transferring these powers to the national government 
(or, when extinguishing these powers altogether, to no govern-
ment at all).
For about a century (from the 1850s to the 1950s), the dominant 
transportation and communication technologies (the railroad, 
telegraph, automobile, telephone, and radio) reinforced national 
identity and a nationalist ideology over alternative identities and 
ideologies, in particular smaller or state ones and larger or inter-
national ones. This meant that people who thought of themselves 
as American patriots or nationalists, and who sought to conserve 
the American nation and to promote American national interests 
(as they understood these to be), had a ready and powerful ally in 
business conservatives. During this era, these two kinds of conser-
vatives came together within the Republican Party. In particular, 
both nationalist and business conservatives could support protec-
tionism with respect to international trade policy. But once busi-
ness (especially the bigger businesses) could make more money in 
the international or even global arena than in the national one, the 
business conservatives would betray the nationalist conservatives.
For a time this conflict within the Republican Party between a 
nationalist ideology and an international market was masked by 
an imperialist ideology — the American nation was simply express-
ing and fulfilling itself within an expanded, extraterritorial area. 
But after the debacles of the various European and Japanese impe-
rialisms during and after the Second World War, the imperialist 
ideology could no longer be legitimate in the United States. Busi-
ness instead supported an internationalist ideology and eventually 
a full-blown globalist one. Today, there still remain many Ameri-
can patriots or nationalists, but they are not found among the big 
businesses and the pillars of great wealth. The nationalist version 
of American conservatism, like the religious version, has been 
betrayed and marginalized, and it is now largely found only among 
small businesses and industrial workers.
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The principal reason for this post-national development lies in 
the same technological process that earlier brought about national 
development. During the past half-century, new transportation 
and communication technologies have ushered in new ideas about 
which political and governmental units provide the best territorial 
scope for business operations. Thus, the jet airplane and telecom-
munications, and more recently the computer and the Internet, 
have enabled businesses to reach and to push beyond the bound-
aries of particular nation-states — even one as large as the United 
States — and now the most efficient operating and profit-making 
area is the globe itself. Business firms soon left behind any iden-
tification — be it practical, ideological, or sentimental — with the 
nation-state in which they were founded and incorporated, and 
they sought to expand to the very ends of the earth. This was true 
even with the United States itself, which has provided American 
multinational corporations and banks with so much support in 
their negotiations with foreign governments. Although these firms 
have grown to great strength because of the opportunities and 
protection provided by the United States, they have ceased to have 
any real identity with (and loyalty to) America as a distinct nation. 
These enterprises have been a relentless and often ruthless force 
hollowing out the powers of the United States (as well as of other 
nations) and transferring these powers to international financial 
institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the World Trade Organization) or to “global regimes” 
or “global governance” (or to no governance at all).8
We have examined three dimensions or arenas of American 
conservatism — economic, religious, and security — and we have 
seen that, from a European perspective, American conservatism 
was not conservative at all, but actually was a kind of classical lib-
eralism. Insofar as American conservatism was involved in conserv-
ing anything, it was precisely this liberalism.
The three dimensions of American conservatism each had 
their own distinct logic. However, they also had much in common. 
First, each conceived of its relevant environment or condition as 
being relatively open and unconstrained. This meant that units 
operating within this environment had a good deal of leeway or 
freedom to do what they pleased (always recognizing, of course, 
that they would be bumping into other, similar, even equal units, 
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and this condition would provide its own kind of constraint). Ulti-
mately, the leeway or freedom of the units was so unconstrained 
that they could dissolve or disintegrate into their least common 
denominator, into their smallest possible element, and this of 
course was the individual. Individualism, therefore, was at the 
very core and foundation of American identity, and particularly of 
American conservatism.9
The Golden Age and the Indian Summer of the 
Original American Conservatism
For many decades after the founding of the United States, the 
economic, religious, and security conditions that enabled this 
pervasive individualism — and the pervasive classical liberalism 
and therefore the peculiar and paradoxical American conserva-
tism that was defined by it — largely endured. This was particu-
larly true of the century between the War of 1812 and the First 
World War. The American Civil War, which came precisely in 
the middle of this century, was an apparent exception, but actu-
ally it largely confirmed the distinctive American pattern, and in 
any event it only lasted four years. Thus, this particular Ameri-
can century can be seen as a sort of golden age for this peculiar 
American conservatism.
Again, one might have expected that the First World War would 
bring an end to the distinctive American conditions — it certainly 
brought an end to any strong and solid basis for classical liberalism 
in Europe itself.10 However, America’s participation in the war was 
actually very brief (U.S. forces did not really begin combat opera-
tions until March 1918, and these were over in eight months) and 
with relatively few casualties (U.S. forces suffered far fewer com-
bat fatalities than any of the other great powers — for example, 
only 8 percent of those of France — and even fewer combat fatali-
ties than most of the small participants — such as those of Roma-
nia).11 Moreover, the wartime experience seemed decisively to 
vindicate and even enhance the strengths of both the traditional 
American economic system and traditional American moral prin-
ciples. Consequently, when the war was over, the United States 
eagerly and rapidly returned to its traditional ideas and ideals, to 
what was seen as “normalcy” in each of the economic, religious, 
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and security dimensions, and it did so under the leadership of 
the Republican Party, the political party that was most identified 
with the great project of American conservatism, that is, of con-
serving, and restoring, classical liberalism, including its core ideal 
of individualism.
However, the 1920s were not really a new golden age for Ameri-
can conservatism. Too many changes and challenges had recently 
occurred within the economic, religious, and security arenas for 
there to be a full restoration of the American world of the nine-
teenth century. Rather, the 1920s can accurately be seen as a sort 
of Indian summer of that world. The decade represents a culmi-
nation of the original, and by then traditional, American conser-
vatism, just before that conservatism would be assaulted by the 
economic challenges posed by the Great Depression, the religious 
challenges posed by secularization within the American social and 
cultural elites, and the security challenges posed by the Second 
World War.
The 1930s: The Great Debacle of the Original 
American Conservatism
The orderly world and Indian summer of this original American 
conservatism abruptly came to an end as the 1920s themselves 
came to an end. It collapsed under the multidimensional assaults 
posed by the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, the growth 
of secular ideas (and the growing sense that Prohibition was a 
failure) in the late 1920s, and the beginning of Japan’s imperial 
expansion in Manchuria and China in 1931 – 1932.12 By the elec-
tion of 1932, it was clear to a majority of Americans that the old 
conservative order had collapsed.13 Although it was not so clear 
that the policies of the Republican Party had been the cause of 
this collapse, it did seem clear that the party had not done a good 
job of conserving that order and that it had no convincing plan 
for how to restore it. The election of Franklin Roosevelt as presi-
dent and of a large Democratic majority in Congress initiated a 
whole new era in American history, and in the history of American 
conservatism more particularly. Indeed, for much of the next half-
century, it almost seemed that the history of American conserva-
tism had itself come to an end.
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The original American conservatism did not respond well in the 
1930s to the multidimensional challenges in the economic, reli-
gious, and security arenas. Indeed, it has been widely believed ever 
since that it failed in each of these three great tests of that time. 
Consequently, American conservatism was on the defensive and 
on the decline for several decades. It would not begin to revive — 
or rather be reinvented — until the fusionist project of the early 
1960s, and it would not be truly robust again until the Reagan era 
of the 1980s. But, as we shall discuss in the concluding sections of 
this chapter, this reinvented American conservatism is itself now 
on the defensive and on the decline. Perhaps, in its own way, re-
invented American conservatism has failed the great economic, 
religious, and security tests of our own time.
In the course of the 1930s, conservatives responded to the chal-
lenges by essentially splitting into two camps, and this was the 
case in each of the three arenas. One camp, normally the larger 
one, essentially abandoned the original conservative (really clas-
sical liberal) position. Most economic and social elites made this 
choice. They adopted instead moderate versions of the political 
ideology that was coming into being with Roosevelt’s New Deal in 
economic policy, but also with greater secularism in religion and 
greater internationalism in foreign affairs. Although often called 
“liberalism,” this new ideology envisioned a much larger role for 
the federal government in many sectors of society; it had much 
more in common with the Progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson than it had with classical liberalism. (Indeed, 
it would be more accurate to call this particular worldview progres-
sivism, rather than the commonly used term of liberalism.) This 
camp of conservatives, therefore, was hardly conservative at all. 
Rather, they were merely moderate progressives.
Of course, the original conservatives had not really been conser-
vatives either. They were merely classical liberals. It seems to be the 
case in America that most so-called conservatives have really been 
something else. This has confused not only external observers of 
American conservatism (be they on the European Right or on the 
American Left), but it has confused American conservatives as well.
However, the second camp, normally the smaller one, largely 
continued to adhere to the original conservative (classical liberal) 
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position. This was especially the choice of many ordinary persons, 
particularly small businessmen and Bible-believing Protestants. 
Although these persons might still form the social elite in small 
towns, they decidedly did not form the elites in the cities and at 
the national level. And, step-by-step in the course of the 1930s and 
1940s, they ceased to form the elite of the Republican Party. The 
last Republican presidential candidate to represent some version 
of original American conservatism was Alf Landon in 1936, and 
his decisive electoral defeat, even debacle, confirmed the view for 
most of the Republican leadership that the old conservatism could 
no longer win elections. For almost three decades thereafter, until 
the candidacy of Barry Goldwater in 1964, every Republican presi-
dential nominee was some kind of “moderate conservative” or 
“liberal Republican” — and in favor of some kind of large role for 
the federal government in many sectors of society (these candi-
dates were: Wendell Wilkie in 1940, Thomas Dewey in 1944 and 
1948, Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, and Richard Nixon 
in 1960). The similarity of the policy positions of these Republi-
can candidates to those of their Democratic opponents caused 
many political commentators to refer to the Republicans as the 
“me-too” party.
Consequently, if one is interested in American conservatism, 
one will not find much interesting in the Republican Party during 
the period that stretched from the late 1930s to the early 1960s, 
or at least in its leadership and its elite. Insofar as there was a gen-
uine American conservatism during this era, it was found within 
the minority camp of the Republican Party, whose geographical 
location was centered in the Midwestern states and whose socio-
logical location was centered in small businessmen, Bible-believing 
Protestants, and traditional patriots of British or “old-stock” ori-
gin. Their principal leader for many years was Senator Robert Taft 
of Ohio (whom his followers called “Mr. Republican”). After his 
death in 1954, however, conservatives were largely bereft of any 
real political leader at the national level, until the emergence of 
Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona (who announced his candi-
dacy for this role with the publication of his book The Conscience 
of a Conservative in 1960 and who subsequently ran for president 
in 1964).
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The Mid-Twentieth Century: The Golden Age of 
American Progressivism
Thus for three decades — from the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s and 
from the Great Depression to the Vietnam War — American politi-
cal ideas and public policies were shaped by what was sometimes 
called “the liberal consensus” (although it was actually a progres-
sive one) and by its counterpart, the conservative marginalization. 
This era saw such epic American achievements as the recovery 
from the Great Depression, the winning of the Second World War 
(with war production largely explaining the economic recovery), 
the rise of the United States to superpower status, the peace and 
prosperity of the Eisenhower years, and the apparent taming of 
the business cycle (with depressions being replaced by mere reces-
sions) by some version of Keynesian policies, be it the “military 
Keynesianism” of the Eisenhower administration (defense spend-
ing accounting for 10 percent of GNP, even in a time of purported 
peace) or the “economic fine-tuning” of the Kennedy adminis-
tration. And for these achievements, progressive policies got the 
credit. It certainly seemed that American conservatism had noth-
ing significant to add, or even to say.
What then explains the conservative revival that eventually oc-
curred by the late 1970s and which took control of the U.S. gov-
ernment with the election of Ronald Reagan as president and of a 
Republican-controlled Senate in 1980? Conservative thinkers and 
think tanks (especially neo-conservative ones) ascribe this revival 
and its success (which they call “the Reagan Revolution”) to their 
own thoughts, that is, to the philosophical and political ideas and 
policy proposals that they published in their journals (examples 
include The Public Interest, The National Review, and Commentary). 
Standard histories of the conservative movement give a lot of 
weight to such thinkers (or publicists) as Russell Kirk, William F. 
Buckley, James Q. Wilson, Irving Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz.14
All of this attention by conservative writers to other conserva-
tive writers (or to themselves) makes for rather tiresome read-
ing about thinkers regarding whom most American citizens and 
politicians (including Republican ones) have never thought. 
In any event, the decisive causes for the revival — or more accu-
rately, the reinvention — of American conservatism lay not in new 
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conservative thinking, but rather in two sets of causes which were 
more fundamental — and which were less mental and more mate-
rial. These were, first, the failures of particular progressive poli-
cies, which by the 1970s had become apparent to almost everyone, 
and, second, the shifts that occurred among particular compo-
nents that formed the social bases of the two political parties and 
their associated ideological movements.
The 1970s: The Great Debacle of 
American Progressivism
The progressive policy failures occurred in the same three arenas — 
the economic, the religious (by now also the moral and social), 
and the security — that had been the locus of the conservative fail-
ures in the 1930s.
The economic arena: Forty years after the beginning of the 
Great Depression, the United States and the world more gener-
ally experienced another great economic crisis, one that eventu-
ally came to be called the Great Stagflation. It was similar to the 
Great Depression, in that the major industrial nations suffered a 
significant rise in prolonged unemployment. However, the level 
of unemployment, although prolonged, only reached the level 
of previous recessions, not of the Great Depression itself. Con-
versely, this economic crisis was different from the Great Depres-
sion in that the major industrial nations suffered a sharp rise in 
prolonged inflation (with annual rates often at double-digit lev-
els). The conjunction of the stagnation of unemployment and 
the inflation of currencies gave the prolonged crisis its name, the 
Great Stagflation.15
It was the inflation part that most alarmed middle-class popu-
lations and most confounded progressive and “moderate conser-
vative” politicians. By the late 1960s, these politicians had fully 
embraced Keynesian theories about the proper way to effectively 
manage the economy. But although Keynesianism certainly could 
claim to have a solution to the problem of unemployment (which 
had been the central problem of the Great Depression), it had 
never focused upon the problem of inflation. With the onset of 
substantial and sustained inflation after 1968, the United States, 
as well as many other industrial nations, was confronted with a 
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great economic challenge for which Keynesianism had no solu-
tion. Even though the problem of stagflation persisted for years, 
indeed throughout the 1970s, Keynesian economists were never 
able to develop a convincing theory of the crisis, and progressive 
and moderate-conservative (i.e., Democratic and Republican) 
political leaders were never able to implement an effective policy 
to tame it. This failure went a long way toward discrediting pro-
gressivism in the minds of many Americans, and particularly those 
in the inflation-impacted middle class.
The religious and social arena: At about the same time as the 
Great Stagflation and the failure of Keynesian economic policies, 
there was a somewhat parallel development of dilemmas within 
the progressive welfare state and a failure of Great Society social 
policies. By the mid-1970s, it had become clear that something was 
going wrong with these social policies, particularly with regard to 
American blacks. Although a minority of blacks seemed to benefit 
from the policies and entered the middle class (analogous to “the 
talented tenth” that W. E. B. Dubois had observed as early as the 
1900s), the majority of blacks remained caught in a complex of 
deprived backgrounds, low education, high unemployment, vio-
lent surroundings, and extremely high rates of crime. Once again, 
the middle-class population was alarmed, and the progressive and 
moderate-conservative politicians were confounded. Progressive 
sociologists were never able to develop a convincing theory of the 
problems in the black population, and progressive and moderate-
conservative (i.e., Democratic and Republican) political leaders 
were never able to implement an effective policy to solve them. 
This failure also went a long way toward discrediting progressiv-
ism in the minds of many Americans, and especially those in the 
crime-impacted middle class.
The evident failure of progressivism to address the economic 
problems posed by the Great Stagflation and the social prob-
lems within the black population, and indeed the direct impact 
that pro-black policies had upon sectors of the white population, 
brought about a new set of major changes in the social bases of the 
two political parties and their associated ideological movements. 
In particular, two large groups, which had long identified with the 
Democratic Party, shifted their votes to the conservative wing of 
the Republican Party. The first was Southern whites, who obviously 
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saw racial issues as a top priority. The second was ethnic Catholics, 
some even within the working class, who paid the most direct costs 
for policies of school integration and affirmative action. As a result 
of these shifts in social bases, the progressive part of the Demo-
cratic Party became much more dependent upon and shaped 
by its remaining components, that is, the media, academia, and 
municipal-employee and teachers’ unions.16
The security arena: By the late 1960s, yet another great fail-
ure of progressivism and moderate conservatism was becoming 
manifest. This, of course, was the Vietnam War. The U.S. military 
intervention in Vietnam, initiated by the Kennedy administration 
in 1961 and greatly expanded by the Johnson administration in 
1965, certainly was an expression of such progressive ideals as 
internationalism (backed by military interventionism) and nation-
building (legitimated by democratic rhetoric). And it was also 
an expression of moderate-conservative imperatives such as anti-
Communism and containment. But by 1968, the U.S. war in Viet-
nam was clearly going very badly, and for this pressing problem 
the Johnson administration and the conventional progressives 
again had no convincing solution. This incapacity of progressives 
in the face of this great security challenge was a central factor in 
Lyndon Johnson’s decision in March 1968 not to run for reelec-
tion that year. It was also a central factor in the election of Richard 
Nixon as president.
Eventually the progressives were given a second chance at secu-
rity policy with the election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976. 
By now, they had learned from their failure in Vietnam about the 
costs of military intervention and militant anti-communism, and in 
its first three years the Carter administration pursued a relatively 
passive security policy. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union 
had been emboldened by the U.S. failure in Indochina and by the 
establishment of Communist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos, and it soon enabled Marxist movements to gain power in a 
wide range of countries elsewhere. The Soviet Union and more 
generally Communism seemed to be on a roll, and the progres-
sives seemed to have no convincing ideas or effective policies to 
meet this challenge.
The resurgent security challenge posed by the Soviet Union 
and communism was soon joined by a new security challenge 
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posed by Iran and Islamism. The Carter administration’s ineffec-
tive responses to the Islamic Revolution in Iran and to the hos-
tage crisis at the U.S. embassy there were widely seen as a humiliat-
ing debacle for the United States. Here was yet another security 
challenge for which the progressives seemed to have no convinc-
ing ideas or effective policies. This double failure in the security 
arena completed the discrediting of progressivism in the minds of 
many Americans.
The Late Twentieth Century: The Revival and 
Reinvention of American Conservatism
Given the progressive failures across three policy arenas — adding 
up to progressivism’s own great debacle — the way was clear for 
some kind of conservatism to reappear as a serious force in Ameri-
can history, and this did indeed occur during the 1970s. However, 
this kind of conservatism was not really a revival of the original or 
traditional American version. Rather, it was something quite differ-
ent, a reinvention of American conservatism altogether, one that 
stretched across all three policy arenas.
The economic arena: As it happened, by the 1970s there was 
a body of economic ideas which claimed that it could solve the 
problem of inflation (and, in doing so, also the problem of unem-
ployment). This lay in the theories of Milton Friedman and more 
generally of what was known as the “monetarist school.” Whereas 
Keynes and his followers focused upon government spending 
and fiscal policy as the balance wheel of the economy, Friedman 
and his followers focused upon the money supply and monetary 
policy as that balance wheel. And whereas Keynesianism called 
upon government (and elected officials) to intervene directly 
in the economy through expenditures and taxes, Friedmanism 
called upon the central bank — which in the United States is the 
Federal Reserve System (and appointed officials who are largely 
independent of elected ones but actually quite dependent upon 
the executives of major banks) — merely to intervene indirectly in 
the economy through interest rates and the overall money supply. 
Friedmanism thus advocated a radical shift in the location of the 
economy’s balance wheel and therefore in the power of those who 
would run it.
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Although Friedman and his followers were always talking about 
the virtues of the free market and of conservatism in economic 
affairs, their approach was not truly a free-market or original-
conservative one at all. Instead, they advocated a controlled mar-
ket in matters of money, credit, and finance, while advocating a 
free market with respect to almost everything else. And the market 
in money, credit, and finance was to be controlled by an oligopoly 
of the major banks, implemented through the Federal Reserve 
System (whose name made it sound like some kind of govern-
ment agency, but whose reality made it more a cartel of profit-
making banks).
A truly free-market and original-conservative set of ideas about 
the money supply, and about the general economy, also existed 
in the late 1970s, and this was found in the theories of Fried-
rich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and what was called the “Austrian 
school.” They argued that the economy, including its interest 
rates and money supply, should operate without any organized 
intervention at all, whether by government agencies or by a 
banker’s cartel.17
During the era of Keynesian hegemony in economic affairs, 
both the monetarist school and the Austrian school had been 
marginalized in academic economics departments and among 
economic-policy advisors. But the failure and incapacity of Keynes-
ianism meant that these two marginalized alternatives now had 
an opportunity to supercede it. A main reason why Friedmanism 
became the alternative that did so, rather than the ideas of Hayek 
and von Mises, was that the former had a large complex of eco-
nomic interests (the major banks: “Wall Street”) supporting it, 
while the latter had no such support (the only substantial inter-
ests likely to support it were small banks and small businesses: 
“Main Street”).
The monetarist approach was adopted by the Federal Reserve 
System in 1979 and implemented by its chairman, Paul Volcker, 
in 1979 – 1982. Volcker’s actions were indeed highly effective 
(although of course temporarily very painful) in bringing inflation 
to an end, and in 1983 the U.S. economy began a period of impres-
sive growth that was largely sustained for almost two decades, until 
2000. This success in solving the problem of inflation, while also 
providing for growing employment — for bringing an end to the 
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Great Stagflation — gave Friedmanism an enormous boost in cred-
ibility and prestige. It now became hegemonic in academic eco-
nomics departments and among economic-policy advisors, and it 
has held this dominant position for 30 years (1980s to 2010s) after 
the Great Stagflation, just as Keynesianism had been hegemonic 
for about 30 years (1940s to 1970s) after the Great Depression. Of 
course, the Friedman school has been just as insistent and effective 
in keeping the Austrian school marginalized (and indeed virtually 
unknown) as the Keynesian school had been before.
Since Friedmanism is not truly a free-market approach (despite 
its rhetorical claims to be so), what is its relation to American con-
servatism as this applies to the economic arena? It is most accu-
rately seen as a kind of pseudo-conservatism, not as an example 
of the original American conservatism. This means that when the 
“conservative movement” and the Reagan Revolution brought 
about a “revival” of American conservatism, it was actually bring-
ing about its reinvention on the economic dimension. Conse-
quently, this most central and weighty dimension of American con-
servatism would not be truly conservative at all, in any real sense 
of the word (in either its traditional European or its traditional 
American meaning).
Nevertheless, the pseudo-conservatism of Friedmanism had a 
very good run at managing the American economy for a very long 
time (almost 30 years), just like the progressivism or pseudo-
liberalism of Keynesianism had had previously (also 30 years). 
However, as we shall see, the hegemony of the major banks within 
the hegemony of Friedmanism was a birth defect and fatal flaw 
that would eventually work its way out and bring about the next 
great economic crisis, that is, the Great Recession that began in 
2007 and that continues until today.
The religious and social arena: During the long era of progres-
sive ascendancy, which included both progressives and moderate 
conservatives, both Democratic and Republican elites — Bible-
believing Protestants had largely remained a component of the 
original-conservative minority within the Republican Party. How-
ever, they did not have any reliable and effective political vehicle, 
and they were marginalized in electoral policies and in public pol-
icy. Then, a number of developments in the 1970s brought about a 
rise in their potential influence.
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First, after several decades of political inactivity, Bible-believing 
Protestants were awakened and energized by particular progres-
sive advances with regard to moral issues. The most central of 
these was the issue of abortion, for which a monumental milestone 
was the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973. Just as 
Prohibition had been “the Great Crusade” of conservative Protes-
tants for three generations from the 1870s to the 1920s, so Pro-Life 
became their great crusade for the three decades from the 1970s 
to the 2000s.
Second, as we have seen, the shifts in the social bases of the 
two political parties and their associated ideological movements, 
which were produced by progressive policies and which occurred 
in the 1970s, brought Southern whites and ethnic Catholics into 
the Republican Party. As it happened, each of these groups had 
something important in common with the Bible-believing Protes-
tants who were already in the party. For Southern whites, this was 
the Protestant part (and, indeed, when Southern whites had been 
Democrats, many had also been among the most Bible-believing 
people in America). For ethnic Catholics, this was the Pro-Life 
part. Thus, the shifts in social bases brought about a new conserva-
tive grand alliance with respect to religious and social issues and 
around commonly shared “traditional moral values.”
Of course, traditional conservatives had long been bereft of 
any credible national political leader (after the death of Robert 
Taft, Barry Goldwater had briefly been the closest approximation 
to one, and he was much more a social libertarian than a tradi-
tional moral conservative). By itself, religious or traditional moral 
conservatism was not going to produce a credible national politi-
cal figure. However, the fusionist project of the conservative move-
ment had laid the intellectual groundwork for uniting social con-
servatives with economic and security conservatives. And Ronald 
Reagan, “the Great Communicator,” certainly had the gift of being 
able to speak to the different arenas of traditional conservatism, 
in words and concepts that they not only understood, but that 
they loved. It was Reagan who appeared to traditional religious 
and social conservatives to be, at long last, their authentic political 
representative and effective political vehicle. And it was he who 
brought them into the grand alliance of conservatives that pro-
vided the electoral base for “the Reagan Revolution.”
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We have observed, however, that with regard to economic pol-
icy, the Reagan era and the following years of Republican politi-
cal power did not really produce original-conservative policies, 
but ones that were merely pseudo-conservative. Much the same 
thing can be said for the social policies of the Reagan era and 
later Republican rule. Reagan and some other Republican lead-
ers were excellent in their public speeches and pronouncements 
with respect to traditional moral values. However, when it came to 
implementing these values in actual legislation and practical poli-
cies, the results — after a period lasting almost three decades — have 
been negligible. The main benefit that traditional social conserva-
tives have received from Republicans in the White House and in 
Congress has been four Supreme Court appointments — Antonin 
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel Alito. And so, 
in a sense, the reinvention of American conservatism in the social 
arena actually produced another kind of pseudo-conservatism — or 
at best quasi-conservatism — one that was parallel and analogous to 
the pseudo-conservatism in the economic arena.
Moreover, while the Republicans were in power in the White 
House and in Congress, they facilitated a major change in the 
demographic composition of the U.S. population — and there-
fore in the social bases of the two political parties and their ideo-
logical movements. This was the great increase in immigration — 
including illegal immigration — from Latin America, and especially 
from Mexico. Of course, this increase in immigration had origi-
nated with the Immigration Act of 1965, which can be seen as one 
of the progressive policies of the time, and it had steadily increased 
in numbers during the 1970s. However, it was during the era when 
reinvented conservatism was in ascendency and the Republicans 
were in power that the Hispanic immigration and the ensuing His-
panic births in the United States reached massive proportions. For 
example, in the 1980s, Hispanics accounted for 5 percent of the 
U.S. population; by the late 2000s, as a group they accounted for 
15 percent, surpassing the black population in numbers.
Progressives had their own ideological reasons for facilitating 
immigration, based first upon ideals of racial equality and human 
rights and then upon the ideology of multiculturalism. But why 
did the Republican Party — with its putative social conservatism — 
join the Democratic Party in facilitating this massive demographic 
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and therefore social change? The reason is that the grand alliance 
of reinvented conservatives were simply ordering their priorities 
and following the same script as the grand alliance of original con-
servatives had done in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, that other era of open immigration into the United States. 
That is, the economic interests of business and middle-class con-
servatives in cheap labor trumped the communal interests of the 
cultural and social conservatives.
Of course in the long run, since “demography is destiny,” this 
new and massive demographic sector could become a new and 
massive voting bloc. Given the voting behavior of most previous 
immigrant groups and racial minorities, it seemed most probable 
that this Hispanic voting bloc would largely vote for the Demo-
cratic Party. However, given the hegemony of business interests 
in the Republican Party, it is not surprising that the short-term 
profit-making interests of its business constituency trumped the 
long-term vote-getting interests of the party itself. And so, once 
again, re-invented conservatism was revealed to be merely pseudo-
conservatism. Indeed, given the massive changes that a new His-
panic bloc could produce in American society and politics in the 
future, reinvented conservatism was, at least with respect to the 
social arena, even a kind of anti-conservatism.
The security arena: In the 1970s, a number of policy intellec-
tuals came together to develop a systematic critique not only of 
the security policies of the progressive Carter administration, but 
also those of the preceding moderate-conservative Nixon and 
Ford administrations. They called themselves “neo-conservatives.” 
These thinkers had already developed a systematic critique of pro-
gressive and moderate-conservative social policies, but by the late 
1970s their principal focus was on the security arena. They were 
particularly alarmed about the resurgent Soviet and Communist 
threat and the new Iranian and Islamist threat.18
The neo-conservatives proposed a comprehensive program to 
revitalize U.S. security policy and to strengthen America’s lead-
ership in the world. In particular, they advocated: (1) major in-
creases in U.S. military spending and expansion of U.S. military 
forces; (2) enhanced military assistance to friendly foreign govern-
ments that were threatened by Marxist or Islamist movements; (3) 
enhanced military assistance to insurgent movements that sought 
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to overthrow Marxist regimes (this was the most innovative of the 
neo-conservative proposals; it would eventually be formulated as 
the Reagan Doctrine); and (4) renewed willingness to undertake 
full military interventions, that is, to employ U.S. military forces to 
overthrow unfriendly governments and to protect friendly ones.
With the exception of (3), these proposals merely called for a 
revival of previous U.S. policies and practices in the security arena. 
Indeed, some version of them had earlier been carried out by 
moderate-conservative administrations (Eisenhower and Nixon) 
and even by progressive ones (Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson). 
Even the original-conservative Republican administrations of the 
1920s used such methods in dealing with countries in the Carib-
bean basin and Central America. However, in the era of “the Viet-
nam syndrome” and the unusually passive security policies of the 
Ford and Carter administrations, the neo-conservative proposals 
seemed new, fresh, and vigorous.
The neo-conservative security program was largely adopted by 
the Reagan administration when it came into office in 1981. As 
it turned out, that administration and its successor, the George 
H. W. Bush administration, did achieve a series of extraordinary 
successes in first reducing and then eliminating the Soviet threat 
(examples include the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 
1989, the collapse of East European Communist regimes in late 
1989, the reunification of Germany on Western terms in 1990, and 
finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991). Although 
the actual causes of the Soviet debacle are complex and disputed, 
the neo-conservatives naturally claimed the credit for this historic 
achievement of the Reagan and Bush administrations.
There was still, however, the threat from Iran and from Islamism 
more generally, and this threat continued to grow at the very time 
that the Soviet threat was disappearing. And here, the record of 
the neo-conservatives and the Reagan and Bush administrations 
is marked by significant failures (examples: the U.S. military inter-
vention in Lebanon in 1964 and the growing threat from Islamist 
terrorists in the 1980s and early 1990s). Even the apparent suc-
cesses would later turn into major security problems (as with the 
U.S. assistance to Islamist insurgents against the Soviets in Afghan-
istan in the late 1980s and the U.S. victory over Saddam Hussein 
in Iraq in 1991). And as we shall see in a concluding section of 
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this chapter, the failure of the neo-conservatives would become 
even more manifest when they became one of the two core groups 
(the other being the oil industry) shaping the security policy of 
the George W. Bush administration with respect to the Middle 
East and Islamism. When the neo-conservatives turned their atten-
tion to this region, they largely overlooked the relevant local reali-
ties and instead imposed concepts drawn from abstract ideologies 
that had been developed for other regions, especially for Europe. 
Thus, they spoke a great deal about “Islamo-fascism” and Saddam 
Hussein’s “Stalinism” and, conversely, about the U.S. success in 
occupying and democratizing West Germany and Japan after the 
Second World War.
In what sense, then, can it be said that neo-conservatism is 
an authentic kind of conservatism with respect to U.S. security 
policies pertaining to the Middle East and Islamism? It argues 
for extensive U.S. military involvement, and even U.S. wars, in a 
region where U.S. national interests are unclear and greatly dis-
puted, and there is little that is conservative about this. It too is 
more accurately described as a kind of pseudo-conservatism. And 
it argues for intensive U.S. political involvement to remake Mid-
dle Eastern states and Muslim societies, and there is little that is 
conservative about this. It is more accurately described as a kind 
of anti-conservatism. Overall, then, neo-conservatism is not really 
conservatism at all.
The 2000s: The Great Debacle of Reinvented 
American Conservatism
And so, in the fullness of time (which in America seems to be after 
about three decades), reinvented American conservatism brought 
about its own great debacle, again a debacle great enough to 
encompass all three policy arenas.
The economic arena: The three decades when Friedmanism 
and the monetarist school dominated economic theory and the 
Federal Reserve System dominated economic policy were largely 
an era of impressive economic growth and prosperity. There 
were occasional stock market panics or business recessions (1987 – 
1988, 1991 – 1992, 2000 – 2002), but overall the U.S. economy 
seemed to be operating so smoothly that Alan Greenspan and Ben 
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Bernanke — successive chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board 
and archetypal exponents of the monetarist worldview — could 
call the era (and their own management of the economy) “the 
Great Moderation.”
However, near the end of this era and in the aftermath of 
the recession of 2000 – 2002, some ominous developments and 
unhealthy distortions appeared. The economic boom that began 
in 2003 was based not upon new technologies and investments 
in productive assets (such as the information-technology boom 
of 1993 – 2000), but upon the real estate, especially the housing, 
sector. And soon, the housing boom became a speculative bubble, 
which burst in 2007 and then turned into a bust. Since banks had 
very heavily invested in overvalued real estate and complex secu-
ritized mortgages, the housing crisis soon metastasized into a full-
blown financial crisis, and since credit and finance is the lifeblood 
(and in an era of monetarist and Federal Reserve hegemony, the 
balance wheel) of the economy as a whole, the financial crisis in 
turn soon metastasized into a full-blown economic crisis. Indeed, 
this crisis was in many ways — particularly with respect to high and 
prolonged unemployment — the greatest economic crisis since the 
Great Depression almost 80 years before, and it was soon given its 
own name — the Great Recession.19 It was the major factor causing 
the Republican Party to decisively lose the presidential and con-
gressional elections of 2008.
It was no accident that the Great Moderation ended with a 
speculative bubble in housing and complicated securities. For, 
at the center of this era were the major profit-making banks. 
Throughout this period, they had relentlessly and successively lob-
bied government officials to reduce and remove restrictions upon 
banking activities that had existed ever since the New Deal and 
Depression-era financial legislation of the 1930s (most impor-
tantly, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which limited the risk-taking 
activities of commercial banks). By 2000, the financial sector had 
succeeded in abolishing most of the New Deal legislation, and that 
which remained was very lightly enforced by the anti-regulation 
appointees of the George W. Bush administration. Then, when 
virtually no government restrictions remained upon their profit-
making activities, the major banks decided that they could make 
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the most profit by investing in familiar and apparently solid (“real” 
estate) assets, rather than in innovative and apparently risky (but 
ultimately more productive) enterprises. This kind of decision 
to invest in the familiar rather than the innovative has long been 
characteristic behavior for very large and established banks, and it 
was natural that the major American banks took this path as soon 
as they could.20
And so it was the very ideas, interests, and institutions that 
brought Friedmanism into power and presided over its long era 
of success which then, through their excesses, caused an economic 
crisis that brought their era to an end. And since these ideas, inter-
ests, and institutions have caused so much economic disruption 
and destruction, they can truly be said to be pseudo-conservative, 
rather than authentically conservative.
Of course, when Friedmanism and pseudo-conservatism was 
confronted with the challenges of the Great Recession, they were 
incapable of offering any convincing and effective solutions. In 
this regard, they were like their predecessors, first the free-market 
advocates and traditional conservatives when they were con-
fronted with the challenges of the Great Depression and then the 
Keynesians and progressives when they were confronted with the 
challenges of the Great Stagflation. But just like these previous 
great economic crises were eventually addressed and solved with 
new economic theories and policies, so too we might hope that 
the current crisis will be also. But just as it took about a decade of 
crisis before those earlier new theories and policies at last became 
ascendant, we will probably be waiting for our new solutions to 
the current crisis for quite some time. In the meantime, despite 
the disruption and destruction that they have wrought, the major 
banks and the monetarist school continue to prevail in the making 
of U.S. economic policy.
The religious and social arena: Since the political representa-
tives of reinvented conservatism produced a good deal of religious 
and social conservative rhetoric but negligible policy results, there 
were not any policy failures of reinvented conservatism in the 
religious and social arena comparable to those in the economic 
arena and contributing to its contemporary great debacle. How-
ever, the choices that reinvented conservatives made with respect 
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to immigration policy from the 1980s to the 2000s finally matured 
into political consequences in 2008. In that year, Hispanics over-
whelmingly (about 70 percent) voted for the Democratic Party, 
and they provided the margin for victory for many Democratic 
elected officials. Hispanics repeated this electoral role in 2012. 
The prospects are that this strong Hispanic identification with the 
Democratic Party will continue into the future, adding another 
large voting bloc to the Democratic base, parallel to the one that 
blacks have long provided to the party. (Together, these two voting 
blocks of the Democratic Party will greatly outweigh the only com-
parable voting bloc in the Republic Party, that of white Evangeli-
cals — or, more accurately, white Bible-believing Protestants.) The 
recent coming into maturity of this great transformation in U.S. 
electoral politics has contributed a good deal to the great debacle 
of reinvented conservatism.
The security arena: By the late 2000s, another failure of rein-
vented conservatism — and particularly of neo-conservatism — 
was becoming manifest. This was, of course, the Iraq War, joined 
increasingly by a parallel failure in the Afghan War. The U.S. war 
in Iraq, which the George W. Bush administration had begun in 
2003, was certainly an expression of neo-conservative policies such 
as a willingness, even eagerness, to employ U.S. military forces to 
overthrow unfriendly governments and to impose democracy-pro-
motion and nation-building on foreign countries. The same had 
become true of the way the Bush administration conducted its war 
in Afghanistan, after its initially successful overthrow of the Tali-
ban regime in late 2001.
By 2006, the Iraq War was clearly going very badly, and for this 
pressing problem the Bush administration and neo-conservatives 
deservedly got the blame. This was a major factor in the Repub-
licans’ losing control of Congress to the Democrats in 2006. 
Although the new counter-insurgency strategy of General David 
Petraeus and the military “surge” authorized by President Bush 
in 2007 seemed to turn the Iraq debacle around dramatically by 
2008, the grueling and growing war in Afghanistan threatened 
a new debacle. The major cause of the Republican defeat in the 
2008 presidential and congressional elections was of course the 
onset of the Great Recession, but the Afghan War was an addi-
tional and substantial contributing factor.
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The 2010s: American Conservatism in the Great 
Recession
The depth, scope, and length of the current global economic 
crisis — greater than any economic crisis since the Great Depres-
sion — has meant that economic and fiscal issues now dominate 
American politics. Although issues in the religious/social and 
security arenas are still intensely debated, most of the focus and 
energy of what now passes for American conservatism is devoted 
to the economic arena. As we have seen, this has always been the 
most important arena in American conservatism, and it is now 
even more central and determinative than before.
The economic arena: The policy response of the George W. 
Bush administration to the financial crisis of 2008 was completely 
in keeping with the economic priorities of the reinvented, pseudo-
conservatism that had brought about the crisis in the first place, 
which is to say, massive government bailouts of large financial 
institutions (“Wall Street”). These bailouts were so massive that 
they provoked opposition from long-dormant elements within the 
Republican Party which represented small banks and small busi-
nesses (“Main Street”), but when directed at a Republican adminis-
tration, this opposition was only brief and ineffective (for example, 
Congress’s initial rejection of the administration’s TARP plan).
However, the succeeding Obama administration also pursued 
economic policies which privileged large financial institutions, 
while not doing much that actually improved the condition of 
other sectors of the economy (such as unemployed workers). 
Moreover, the budgets of the Obama administration and the Dem-
ocratic Congress resulted in a massive expansion of federal deficits 
and debt (an expansion that had actually begun under the pre-
ceding Bush administration and Republican Congresses). Now the 
small-bank and small-business elements in the Republican Party 
had Democratic targets to oppose, and their opposition could 
be more sustained and more effective. The result was the begin-
ning of the Tea Party movement in the summer of 2009, which was 
able to achieve significant successes in the congressional elections 
of 2010.21
The economic and fiscal thinking of the Tea Party move-
ment had much in common with that of the original American 
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conservatism, and with theorists such as Friedrich Hayek and Lud-
wig von Mises. It had much less in common with the economic 
and fiscal thinking of reinvented conservatism, and with theorists 
such as Friedman and the monetarists. Indeed, the thinking of the 
Tea Party movement was largely the same as that of the libertarian 
movement, which had long been a marginal element within the 
Republican Party.
Consequently, with respect to the economic arena, American 
conservatism is now split between two tendencies: (1) a partially 
discredited reinvented conservatism, which nevertheless contin-
ues to dominate the leadership or “establishment” of the Republi-
can Party because it corresponds to the economic interests of the 
party’s elites and big donors; and (2) a partially revived original 
conservatism, which is a significant insurgent force within the 
Republican Party, because it corresponds to the economic inter-
ests of much of the party’s base and many of its core voters.
This split was played out in the 2012 primary elections to nomi-
nate the Republican candidate for president. From the beginning, 
indeed as early as 2009, the preferred candidate of the Republi-
can leadership and elite was Mitt Romney. In the early Republican 
primaries (those with several candidates competing, representing 
the several different tendencies within the Party), Mitt Romney 
consistently led with respect to campaign funding and the support 
of most big donors, but he usually received less than 30 percent 
of the votes. Conversely, the Tea Party voters often preferred Ron 
Paul, but they recognized that he could never win the nomination; 
consequently, their votes were split among several different can-
didates other than Romney. The party leadership had early deter-
mined that their best strategy to achieve a Romney nomination 
was to split the anti-Romney vote among several different candi-
dates, no one of which could achieve a majority, or perhaps even 
a plurality, and this strategy proved successful. The insurgent or 
anti-Romney candidates cancelled out each other. Romney may 
not have achieved majorities, but he did achieve more pluralities 
than anyone else, and therefore the nomination. The party lead-
ership calculated that any disaffected Tea Party voters could be 
corralled into voting for Romney against President Obama in the 
general election.
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The religious and social arena: In contrast to the even greater 
dominance of economic and fiscal issues within American conser-
vatism since 2008, religious and social issues have been pushed 
even further to the margins. Both the Republican Party establish-
ment and the Tea Party movement consider religious and social 
issues to be at best a distraction from the central arena of economic 
and fiscal issues, and at worst causing an actual subtraction of votes 
of independents from Republican candidates; consequently, both 
agreed to marginalize these issues in the 2012 elections. Even 
such a fundamental and immediate concern of religious conser-
vatives as homosexual marriage was given very little attention in 
the Republican presidential primaries. The religious conservatives 
did have a preferred candidate, Rick Santorum (who is a Roman 
Catholic, not an Evangelical Protestant), and he did score a couple 
of primary victories, but like the other anti-Romney candidates, he 
was soon overwhelmed by the Romney strategy and money. And, 
in the end, the marginalization of Evangelical Protestants even 
within the Republican Party culminated in the Romney/Ryan 
nominations, the first major-party president/vice-president ticket 
in American history that did not include a Protestant.
Meanwhile, the Hispanic percentage of the electorate contin-
ued to increase, and their votes continued to go overwhelmingly 
to the Democratic Party. With all of its focus upon economic and 
fiscal issues, the Republican Party was not able to develop a coher-
ent and effective strategy to win over Hispanic voters in the 2012 
elections. Indeed, many traditional conservatives were opposed to 
Hispanic immigration, and they found some voice in the Tea Party 
movement. This drove Hispanic voters even further away from the 
Republican Party. Some Republican leaders, alarmed by this devel-
opment, hoped to attract Hispanic voters by having some promi-
nent Hispanic elected official be Romney’s running mate (such as 
Senator Marco Rubio of Florida). But the selection of Paul Ryan 
brought an end to even these fitful efforts to attract Hispanics.
The security arena: The security arena provides another con-
trast in the development of American conservatism in the 2010s. 
In the midst of the continuing global economic crisis, it is not sur-
prising that security and defense issues have been less prominent 
than before 2008, although they have certainly remained more 
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prominent than religious and social ones. What is perhaps surpris-
ing, however, is the continuing articulation of neo-conservative pri-
orities and policies among many Republican leaders. One might 
have thought that neo-conservatism would have been discredited 
by its debacle in the Iraq and Afghan wars, but in the election year 
of 2012, it was just as prominent among Republican candidates for 
president as it had been in the George W. Bush administration, 
which put the United States into those wars.
The explanation for the continuing prominence of neo-conser-
vatism in the Republican Party does not lie in the base of Republi-
can voters. Most of these have become critical or skeptical of U.S. 
military interventions abroad, especially for such remote goals as 
nation-building and promoting democracy. In particular, the Tea 
Party movement has largely avoided discussion of security and 
defense issues, and many of its members take positions similar to 
those of the anti-interventionist (and anti-defense-spending) lib-
ertarian movement. Rather, the explanation lies in the Republi-
can elite, and particularly with some of the Republican Party’s big 
donors. These are found in both older sources of funding, such as 
the defense industry, and newer sources of funding, such as hedge 
funds, and they continue to support neo-conservative priorities 
and policies, particularly with respect to the Middle East.
In the early Republican primaries of 2012, the neo-conserva-
tives’ preferred presidential candidate was Newt Gingrich. Indeed, 
it was funding (in the amount of $15 million) from just one big 
donor, Sheldon Adelson, a casino magnate, that accounted for 
there being a Gingrich campaign at all and for its few and brief 
successes.22 When it became clear that Romney was going to win 
the nomination, the neo-conservative donors, including Shel-
don Adelson, then threw their support to him. Romney recipro-
cated by appointing a large panel of advisors, most of whom were 
prominent neo-conservatives, on security and defense issues and 
by making a series of well-publicized speeches, which advocated 
just about every neo-conservative priority and policy. However, 
there is an obvious contradiction between the fiscal conservatism 
of a substantial majority of the Republican Party’s big donors and 
the security neo-conservatism of a significant minority of its big 
donors. This contradiction came to a head during the budget 
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conflicts of 2013, with fiscal conservatism largely prevailing over 
security neo-conservatism.
What, then, is the contemporary character of American conser-
vatism, half a decade after the debacle of the reinvented version, 
brought about by the Great Recession and the ongoing global eco-
nomic crisis? We will sum up the current condition of the conser-
vative coalition in its three component arenas.
In the economic arena, conservatism continues to be domi-
nated and defined by the same kind of big-business, especially big-
bank, priorities and policies that have been dominant for many 
decades. The greatly increased influence in the Republican Party 
of big donors on its candidates for public office has even strength-
ened this domination in recent years.23 But the Party also contin-
ues to articulate the rhetoric of the original, free-market conser-
vatism, and this has been enough to retain its small-business and 
independent-proprietor base among voters. This base has even 
been strengthened in recent years by the energy and activism 
of the Tea Party movement, which on economic issues adheres 
to original-conservative values. In short, with regard to the eco-
nomic arena, American conservatism is now characterized in its 
rhetoric by the values of original conservatism — supported by a 
steady or even strengthened mass base of voters — and in its real-
ity by the priorities and policies of what we have called reinvented 
conservatism — supported by a steady or even strengthened elite 
source of donors.
In the religious and social arena, however, the picture is very 
different. This kind of conservatism is today much weaker and 
more marginalized than it was only a few years ago. First, there 
are now very few big donors supporting the electoral campaigns of 
religious and social conservatives (the only prominent exception 
in the 2012 elections was a billionaire investor, Foster Friese, who 
provided the principal financial backing for Rick Santorum). And 
there has also been a substantial decrease in the number of voters 
who count religious and social issues as their chief concern when 
deciding for whom to vote. Moreover, the Republican Party can 
always be confident that this shrinking — but still essential — part 
of its electoral base will continue to cast its votes, however unen-
thusiastically, for Republican candidates and not for Democratic 
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ones. With a very small donor elite and a shrinking and subordi-
nate voter base, it is not surprising that religious and social conser-
vatives are now only a weak and subordinated component within 
today’s American conservatism.
Finally, in the security arena, the picture is again different, 
a kind of mixture of the contrasting situations in the other two 
arenas. First, although the number of big donors who prioritize 
security issues is much smaller than those who prioritize economic 
ones, their donations have been sufficient to buy the security pri-
orities of Republican candidates, at least until the recent budget 
crises and resulting constraints on military spending. These priori-
ties have been those of neo-conservatism, not the original (“real-
ist” in current terminology) conservatism; in fact, today, there are 
virtually no big donors who support realist conservatives as can-
didates for public office. When we turn from the donor elite to 
the voter base, however, the situation is reversed. There are very 
few voters who actually put neo-conservative security priorities and 
policies (such as U.S. military interventions and democracy pro-
motion abroad) as their chief concern when deciding for whom 
to vote. Although there are a small number of voters who do make 
security issues their top concern, the large majority of these actu-
ally adhere to realist-conservative security priorities and policies 
(for example, a strong military to defend America itself).
Whither American Conservatism? 
Toward Yet Another Reinvention
By itself, this review of the various components of the contempo-
rary conservative coalition would suggest that the electoral pros-
pects for the Republican Party in the future are rather poor. There 
is a well-funded and well-mobilized base for economic and fiscal 
conservatism, but although this base is strong, it is narrow. Prob-
ably no more than 30 percent of the national electorate now votes 
the way they do because they hold conservative economic and fis-
cal values, and this is at a time of pronounced economic and fiscal 
crisis. Of course, within particular congressional districts and par-
ticular states, this percentage will be higher, and this will enable 
economic and fiscal conservatives — when they can make alli-
ances with large numbers of religious/social or security/patriotic 
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conservatives — to win elections to the U.S. House of Representa-
tives (and even to win a majority) or to the U.S. Senate (but where 
they are unlikely to win a majority). But in general the prospects 
for conservatives to win presidential elections are doubtful. It is 
possible, then, that the great debacle of reinvented conservatism 
in the 2010s will have consequences for American conservatism 
and the Republican Party similar to those that followed the origi-
nal great debacle of original conservatism in the 1930s. That is, 
American conservatism already will have entered into an era 
where it will mostly be a political minority, while some new version 
of American progressivism will be in political ascendency.
Of course, most Republican politicians are well aware of these 
prospects, and they cannot be expected to just passively accept the 
implications. Rather, we would expect that they will seek to bring 
about yet another reinvention of American conservatism, a new 
version, which would provide a broader and stronger base for the 
Republican Party than the current narrow, incoherent, and with-
ered version. As we have seen, both the original and the reinvented 
versions of American conservatism were based upon a particular 
coalition of distinct social components, and so too will be any new 
reinvention. What might the new social base and new version of 
conservatism look like, given the electoral realities — based upon 
the economic and social, but also demographic realities — of the 
2010s, and beyond? And here, through a glass darkly, we may 
glimpse the increasing significance of both race and gender.
The potential role of racial identity: Racial issues, in the form of 
slavery and the Civil War, were obviously at the origin of the Repub-
lican Party and in its ascendency during its first 70 years. How-
ever, the Party was never seen as the white party. On the contrary, 
where blacks were able to vote, they generally voted Republican. It 
was the Democratic Party in the South (in the once-Confederate 
states) that was seen, and accurately so, as the white party. More 
broadly, after the Civil War, the original American conservatism, 
while neglectful of the interests of black people, did not include 
white racial identity as an important component, even in its social 
or cultural dimensions.
However, the coming of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s — and especially the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 — brought about a new racial reality in 
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American partisan politics and a reversal of the racial identities of 
the Republican and Democratic parties. By the late 1960s, blacks 
were overwhelmingly voting for the Democratic Party, and whites 
in the South were largely voting for the Republican Party. Indeed, 
with their “Southern strategy,” Republican leaders made it a major 
objective to have Southern whites see the Republican Party as the 
white party. In the South, this new racial and partisan reality has 
only become more pronounced during the ensuing half-century.
In the rest of America, however, Republican leaders have gen-
erally tried to avoid a racial identity being attached to the Party. 
Rather, as we have seen, they have emphasized economic/fiscal, 
religious/social, and security/patriotic issues and identities. And 
what has been true of the Republican Party has been even more 
true of the reinvented conservative movement. None of the major 
components of reinvented conservatism have provided any accep-
tance or even acknowledgment of racial issues and identity as 
being legitimate. The only exception is in the social arena, where 
many social and cultural conservatives have criticized affirmative-
action policies that have explicitly and directly given preferences 
to blacks and Hispanics.
These policies seemed to many to be in obvious contradiction 
to all the language and legislation of the Civil Rights Movement 
about prohibiting discrimination based on race and about equal 
rights for all, and it provoked a good deal of resentment — and 
even delegitimization of the federal government — among many 
whites. In recent years, therefore, progressives have developed 
an alternative way of constructing public policies in order to give 
substantial assistance to blacks and Hispanics. Since a much larger 
proportion of these two groups is poor, in comparison with whites 
(and also with Asian Americans), policies that give substantial 
assistance to poor people will implicitly and indirectly also give 
such assistance to blacks and Hispanics. There have been at least 
three major areas where such policies have been implemented in 
recent years: (1) housing ownership; (2) economic stimulus; and 
(3) medical care.
There is therefore a growing consciousness among whites, espe-
cially among older ones, that Democratic programs not only bene-
fit the poor at the expense of the middle class, but that they benefit 
blacks and Hispanics at the expense of whites. This consciousness 
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is heightened by current economic realities, because government 
policies to bring about redistribution of monies from a stagnant 
or shrinking economic pie impose obvious and painful costs upon 
the middle class. Changing demographic realities also heighten 
this consciousness, because the black and Hispanic portion of the 
American population is steadily increasing, with these two groups 
already accounting for a majority of births in the United States 
each year.
Since the conventional identities of Republican voters — be they 
the identities of either original conservatism or reinvented conser-
vatism — now issue in a voting base that is too narrow and withered 
to win most presidential and senatorial elections, the Republican 
Party leadership has to think about how to expand that base, and 
that probably means adding groups with new identities or ones 
that are redefined. In particular, the Republican establishment is 
now trying to somehow persuade many more Hispanics (73 per-
cent of whom voted for Obama in the 2012 presidential election) 
to vote Republican in the future. However, there are formidable 
sociological and political obstacles standing in the way of this 
establishment Hispanic project.
An alternative path for the Republican Party in expanding its 
electoral base leads from the South to the rest of America, that is, 
from the Republicans being the white party in the South to the 
Republicans being the white party in America as a whole. In the 
2012 presidential election Romney got 60 percent of the white 
vote, while Obama received only 38 percent. However, the Repub-
lican establishment knows how dangerous and destructive it would 
be to have an American party system defined and divided along 
racial lines, even if not explicitly or overtly so, and they are reluc-
tant to take this path.
These considerations lead to a prospective realignment — or 
rather a sharpening of the current alignment — of the American 
party system along the following lines: The core voting groups for 
the progressive coalition and the Democratic Party are (1) blacks; 
(2) Hispanics; and (3) workers in the public sector. Conversely, the 
core voting groups for the conservative coalition and the Republi-
can Party are (1) economic and fiscal conservatives; (2) Evangeli-
cal or Bible-believing Protestants; and (3) white male workers in 
the private sector.
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The potential role of gender identity: Of course, in this align-
ment there remains one immense independent or swing group, 
and that is white women. A substantial majority of white women 
now vote for Democratic candidates, with economic issues being 
primary for working-class women and social issues being primary 
for middle-class women. If these women continue to vote for the 
Democratic Party in the future, the prospects for the Republi-
can Party to win most presidential and senatorial elections will 
remain bleak. However, it is also the case that although a sub-
stantial majority of single women vote for Democratic candidates, 
a significant majority of married women vote for Republican 
ones. This suggests that if the Republican Party can find a way 
to enhance its appeal to married women, perhaps with policies 
that genuinely support families, it might be able to strengthen its 
electoral base.
In our long review of the history of American conservatism, we 
have seen it appeal over the decades and in successive versions to 
a wide array of different groups and interests. But neither origi-
nal conservatism nor reinvented conservatism ever had much 
to appeal to women, if they saw their principal identity to be as 
women. The same remains true of the weakened movement that 
now passes for American conservatism and of the Republican 
Party that is its institutional expression. It will only be if the conser-
vatives and the Republicans can convince large numbers of Ameri-
can women, and particularly married women, that their principal 
concern must be to conserve something important to them that 
American conservatism will have a future.
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